The ransomware wave hitting Polish hospitals in 2026

Spring 2026 was exceptionally hard on Polish healthcare — in quick succession, several medical facilities fell victim to ransomware attacks, with systems encrypted and patient data breached. In March 2026 alone, the victims included a hospital in Szczecin and facilities in Racibórz and Czarniecka Góra. This isn’t coincidence, but the result of traits that make the healthcare sector a particularly attractive target.

Why hospitals are in the crosshairs

• Time pressure pays the ransom. When systems go down, continuity of care is at stake. Attackers bet the facility will pay faster than a commercial company.
• Valuable data. Medical records are sensitive data — excellent material for blackmail (double extortion: encryption + threat of publication).
• Technical debt. Older systems, equipment running outdated software, limited IT budgets, and flat networks in which an infection spreads unimpeded.

What such an attack usually looks like

Ransomware rarely starts with encryption — that’s just the finale. The chain most often looks like this: entry (phishing, stolen VPN credentials, an unpatched edge vulnerability) → reconnaissance and privilege escalation → lateral movement across the network → data exfiltration → and only at the end, encryption. Days often pass between the first entry and encryption. That’s the window in which the attack can be detected and stopped — most cheaply.

We cover this in more depth in our piece Ransomware: how to actually defend — the key idea being: break the chain where it’s cheapest, instead of relying on defending “at the final stretch”.

Where to break the chain — priorities

1. Ransomware-resilient backups — offline or immutable, and tested for restoration. A backup you’ve never tried to restore is an assumption, not a plan.
2. MFA everywhere, especially on VPN, email and remote access. Most break-ins start with a stolen password.
3. Network segmentation — separating clinical systems, equipment and admin workstations limits how far an infection spreads.
4. Fast patching of edge systems (VPN, firewalls, gateways) — the most common entry door.
5. Monitoring and detection of lateral movement and mass encryption — the earlier the alarm, the smaller the damage.

Prepare before it happens

The most important element is an incident response plan that’s been rehearsed, not left in a drawer: who makes the decisions, how to isolate infected segments, how to operate without systems (“paper” procedures), and how and when to notify the data-protection authority and patients. Facilities that rehearse this scenario lose hours where the unprepared lose weeks.

The lesson from 2026 is uncomfortable but simple: in healthcare, a ransomware attack is a matter of “when”, not “if”. Resilience is built before the incident — with backups, segmentation, MFA and a rehearsed plan.

We help healthcare providers and critical entities test their resilience to ransomware — from penetration tests and audits to incident response planning. Book a consultation before someone runs that test for you.

Sources and further reading: CERT Polska, CyberDefence24, Niebezpiecznik.