IAM and organisation
We analyse effective rights and administrative boundaries.
- Roles, policies, service accounts and federation
- Organisations, accounts, projects and guardrails
- Keys, secrets and workload identity
We test how IAM, network, data and automation combine into realistic privilege-escalation scenarios.
Cloud risk rarely comes from one critical checkbox. It emerges between an IAM policy, a CI/CD role, a secret, a public service and missing telemetry. We assess those relationships as one system.
We analyse effective rights and administrative boundaries.
We test service exposure and data resilience.
We assess deployment paths and abuse detection.
We agree accounts, owners, critical data, regions and permitted trust boundaries.
Runtime state is connected to Terraform, policies and pipelines when available.
We test whether a limited role can control another workload, secret or identity.
The backlog includes owners, impact and a safe implementation sequence.
We test effective permissions rather than the role name or intended purpose.
This example demonstrates the analysis format and is not client work.
The pipeline can modify the runtime workload definition
The workload inherits a broader runtime identity
That identity can read secrets outside the application scope
The fix separates roles, constrains trust and adds an alert
Not always. We prefer dedicated read-only roles plus controlled permissions for agreed tests. Access is minimised and actions are logged.
Yes when IaC is available. Comparing code with runtime state exposes drift and lets the team fix the source rather than one resource.
Findings can be mapped to a standard, but technical risk is the primary objective. The assessment is not a certification.
We will map accounts, critical data and the most credible escalation paths.