FCC blocks new foreign-made robots and power inverters

On 30 July 2026, wider reporting covered a US Federal Communications Commission decision affecting two networked-device categories: foreign-produced advanced mobile robots and power inverters. The FCC added them to the Covered List, generally preventing new models from receiving equipment authorisation required for US import, marketing and sale.

This is not an order to switch off deployed robots or inverters, and it does not establish an active exploitation campaign. It is a preventive supply-chain action addressing remote control, data collection and the system-level effect of large device fleets on critical infrastructure.

What the FCC decided

The FCC’s official 28 July fact sheet confirms addition of:

• foreign-produced advanced robotic devices, including mobile humanoid and quadruped robots;
• foreign-produced connected power inverters.

The action followed determinations by a US interagency national-security body that these categories posed unacceptable risks to national security or the safety of US persons.

Important scope limits:

• it applies to new models requiring FCC authorisation;
• previously authorised models can continue to be sold;
• devices already purchased remain usable;
• federal government purchase and use are unaffected;
• Conditional Approval is available;
• qualifying security and compatibility updates can continue for authorised hardware.

Reporting published on 30 July highlighted an important waiver: through at least 1 January 2029, software and firmware changes that patch vulnerabilities or facilitate operating-system compatibility can qualify.

“Foreign-produced” does not mean one named brand

The decision does not create an operative list of manufacturers or one country. Under the determinations, “foreign-produced” means an article that does not qualify as a domestic end product under the Buy American standard in 48 CFR 25.101(a).

“FCC bans Chinese robots” would therefore be an overbroad headline. The supporting documents cite vendors and incidents, but legal scope follows production and technical tests rather than a logo alone.

Manufacturers can request Conditional Approval. The Department of War can approve robotic devices, while the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security can approve inverters. The materials set 1 January 2028 as the application deadline.

Which robots fit the definition

Not every vacuum, factory arm or drone automatically qualifies. The definition covers a mobile mechanical device that:

• moves on the ground;
• navigates or avoids obstacles;
• can operate at a distance using commands or sensor data;
• weighs more than 4.4 pounds, about 2 kg, including an applicable dock or ground station;
• carries an environmental sensor;
• supports wired or wireless communication of at least 200 kbps in either direction;
• runs software locally or remotely to control movement, perception, data collection or remote command.

Software includes firmware and AI or machine-learning model weights. Robot security therefore extends beyond an operating system. Perception-model updates, cloud services, operator applications and controller firmware form one trust chain.

Excluded categories

The decision excludes, among others:

• connected road vehicles;
• rail-only equipment;
• uncrewed aircraft;
• unmanned underwater vehicles;
• FDA-regulated medical and mobility devices;
• fixed industrial arms, including SCARA, gantry and delta designs.

Exclusion from this FCC action does not indicate an absence of cyber risk. Those categories have different regulatory and assurance frameworks.

What qualifies as a power inverter

An inverter converts direct current to alternating current or the reverse and contains remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection or monitoring components. It can sit in photovoltaic installations, energy storage, charging and other power-electronics resources.

One device has limited grid impact. Risk grows when thousands or hundreds of thousands of units:

• rely on one vendor backend;
• share an update mechanism;
• accept remote commands;
• report operational data;
• use common keys or service accounts;
• can change mode simultaneously.

A cloud application or update-chain vulnerability then becomes a system issue rather than one local failure.

Robot risks cited in the determination

The supporting assessment references research involving:

• access to cameras, microphones and floor-plan maps from household robots;
• four Bluetooth Low Energy CVEs in the UniPwn research;
• root command execution on selected models;
• potential BLE propagation to nearby devices;
• full remote robot control through a cloud service after obtaining the applicable API key.

This does not mean every covered robot contains every vulnerability. The examples establish the category-level concern: a mobile platform combines sensors, actuators, connectivity and remote administration, so compromise can affect data and physical safety.

Inverter risks cited in the determination

The materials reference Forescout’s SUN:DOWN research, which described 46 flaws across Sungrow, SMA and Growatt products. Researchers modelled fleet manipulation and potential grid-instability effects.

Maintain the boundary between simulation and incident. The research does not confirm that an attacker caused the modelled instability. It demonstrates technical possibility under defined conditions.

The determination also cites Idaho National Laboratory supply-chain analysis, an ERCOT worst-case rapid-grid-collapse scenario and one case where a foreign manufacturer remotely disabled inverters following a dispute with a US distributor. The company is not named in the determination.

Why security updates remain essential

Covered List restrictions affect new authorisation, but blocking all firmware change would increase risk for deployed devices. The security-update waiver is therefore essential.

Distinguish:

• a vulnerability patch;
• compatibility change;
• new remote-control capability;
• backend or telemetry change;
• AI model update affecting behaviour;
• cryptographic component replacement.

Not every “update” has the same risk. Sensitive deployments should require signatures, change manifests, rollback, offline testing and documented provenance.

Meaning for Poland and the EU

The FCC decision does not directly bind Polish companies and does not create an EU sales ban. It is still a useful supplier-risk signal.

An organisation managing robotics or energy assets should ask:

• who controls the cloud backend;
• where data and logs reside;
• whether the device works without vendor cloud;
• whether remote shutdown requires owner approval;
• how service roles are separated;
• whether the vendor publishes SBOMs and advisories;
• whether keys are unique per device;
• how long patches are provided;
• what happens after end of support or supplier failure;
• whether firmware and model updates can be independently validated.

This is supply-chain due diligence, not automatic rejection of every foreign product.

Threat model for a robot

A robot assessment should include:

1. operator application;
2. identity and MFA;
3. vendor API;
4. cloud backend;
5. update channel;
6. controller firmware;
7. operating system;
8. perception model;
9. sensor data and storage;
10. local Wi-Fi and BLE;
11. emergency stop;
12. physical service access.

The most important flaw may not be RCE. Broken API authorisation can be enough to expose maps, view sensors or issue movement commands.

Threat model for an inverter

For inverters, focus on simultaneous availability and grid-parameter impact:

• local management and default passwords;
• modem or gateway;
• telemetry protocols;
• cloud API;
• installer account;
• certificates and keys;
• signed updates;
• group commands;
• rate-of-change limits;
• fail-safe behaviour after cloud loss;
• OT network segmentation;
• local control recovery.

Fleet management should prevent uncontrolled simultaneous changes. Limits, staged rollout and independent parameter monitoring are important safeguards.

Technical actions for device owners

1. inventory model, firmware, backend and account owner;
2. separate robots and inverters from user networks;
3. restrict egress to documented services;
4. require unique credentials and phishing-resistant MFA;
5. disable unused local interfaces;
6. retain command and firmware-change logs;
7. alert on bulk commands and new login geographies;
8. test offline mode and local control recovery;
9. maintain a secure update process;
10. prepare isolation procedures that preserve physical safety.

Do not respond to a robotic incident by abruptly cutting power where that could cause movement, load drops or brake loss. Cyber response must align with functional safety.

Procurement and security controls

Supplier contracts should cover:

• support lifetime;
• critical patch SLA;
• incident notification;
• access to logs;
• SBOM delivery;
• subcontractor control;
• data location;
• vulnerability disclosure;
• backend migration;
• secure decommissioning;
• prohibition of shared service secrets.

Our software supply-chain attack guide and SBOM, CycloneDX and VEX guide provide further procurement and engineering context.

Acceptance testing before fleet connection

Test a representative device on an isolated network before purchase. Record every domain and protocol, confirm replacement of default credentials, verify update signatures and observe behaviour when internet or cloud access disappears. Determine separately whether an installer account retains access after the customer takes ownership.

For a robot, test speed limits, safe stopping and recovery of local control. For an inverter, examine remote set-point boundaries, the rate of fleet-wide commands, loss-of-backend behaviour and alignment between cyber response and grid requirements. Put the results into contractual acceptance criteria rather than leaving them only in a security report.

Sources versus Breachroad conclusions

The FCC confirms Covered List scope, impact on new models, no effect on already purchased devices and the Conditional Approval route. Supporting determinations cite research but do not announce one active compromise campaign across all robots or inverters.

Our technical, contractual and Poland-specific recommendations are Breachroad conclusions. The US decision is threat-model input, not an EU ban.

A cloud and infrastructure security assessment can cover backend, APIs, identities, segmentation and device-update paths. Organisational cybersecurity training helps procurement, engineering and SOC understand shared ownership. Our Minnesota water-systems incident analysis provides additional operational-technology context.